This week, the death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi coincided with the announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the year. The conclusion of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq and the NATO-led campaign in Libya should provide an opportunity for American policymakers to learn from both our failure at nation building in Iraq and the relative success of our measured strategy in Libya.
Touted as a way to export democracy, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 seemed more like crash and burn than shock and awe. It has been clear for years that the invasion of Iraq was strategically foolish—even though the military campaign was a stunning success, America’s strategic position has been weakened by the war. America’s public image has also suffered. Filling the power vacuum left in the wake of a toppled dictator with autocratic American rule renders the supposed liberation futile.
In Libya, the U.S. maintained a much quieter role, collaborating with NATO forces and relying on remote air strikes to achieve military aims. This effort has thus far yielded positive results, as Gaddafi has been removed with no lost American lives and at a much smaller cost. Furthermore, the Libyan people have a far more positive opinion of America than Iraqis do.
Unfortunately, it appears that our policymakers have not yet absorbed the lessons of Iraq and Libya. Despite eight long, frustrating years of war, the Obama administration wanted to keep 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011. The complete withdrawal announced last week was not a result of a principled stance by the Obama administration but of the collapse of negotiations between the American and Iraqi governments to extend the immunity of American troops in Iraq. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the administration, the troops will be home by Christmas.
Even if Washington realizes that heavy-handed interventionism undermines our foreign policy objectives, policymakers should not consider the Libyan strategy a panacea for problems in the Middle East. It would be a dangerous gamble to apply it in Syria, for instance, due to the Syrian leadership’s relationship with Iran and the region’s likely outcry at yet another American-led bombing campaign in the heart of the Arab world.
The outcomes of our campaigns have been incredibly dissimilar. Iraq remains politically shaky and is quickly moving into Iran’s sphere of influence, while Libya may become one of the most Western-friendly Islamic countries in the world. For policymakers, this distinction ought to demonstrate that future attempts at regime change should be based on collaborative efforts with other nations and indigenous resistance movements, not American-style imperialism.
