Some might say that the recent nuclear agreement between President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manhoman Singh is a deal with the devil, essentially trading international nuclear norms for a steady supply of mangoes. But a closer analysis shows that what looks like another example of Bush’s hardheaded disregard for treaties may actually be a tactful decision that benefits the whole international community.
The center of the current controversy is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a document signed in 1968 that controls the development and dispersion of nuclear weapons and technology. Under the agreement, the five nuclear states at the time (the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China) kept their warheads, while other states who signed agreed not to pursue or disperse nuclear weapons. In exchange for this promise, the nuclear states share non-military nuclear technology. India and Pakistan never signed, but they did develop nukes.
Last week India agreed to split its nuclear program in two, making 14 of 22 reactors available to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency by 2014 but maintaining eight outside of inspections and free for military use. In exchange the U.S. agreed to share technology and materials for the civilian plants.
This agreement is a booster shot for nonproliferation. The new agreement addresses the elephant in the room: that India is a nuclear power not recognized nor covered by the NPT. The U.S. is removing this awkwardness by granting India legitimacy as a nuclear state in the same league as the original five.
This legitimacy, reinforced by the participation of the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, allows the international community to be involved in India’s nuclear program, isolated since the “peaceful nuclear explosion”in 1976. Including India makes the non-proliferation regime much more relevant. As for India, it can now purchase uranium for energy production on the global market and dedicate its low domestic supply to growing its own arsenal.
The main argument against the agreement is that the U.S. has a double-standard, drawn into especially sharp relief as Iran goes before the United Nations Security Council to see if their enrichment program does, in fact, have military objectives. The message sent by the agreement is: develop nukes if you want, and if we like you we will ignore the fact that you are flaunting our 30-year peace plan.
What this argument fails to highlight is that everyone flaunts the peace plan. It simply is not working. There is strong evidence that China has helped Pakistan develop its nuclear program for years, sending magnetic rings in 1994 and missiles in the ‘80s. Israel’s weapons are widely recognized, though both they and the U.S. have decided to not rock the NPT boat by declaring them. North Korea has nukes and Iran is highly suspected of developing them even as a current member of the NPT.
The Bush-Singh deal actually strengthens the nonproliferation regime by bringing India, a nuclear state with no record of proliferation, into the family of recognized nuclear powers and supports the world’s largest democracy, an important U.S. ally in a volatile region.
In fact, the deal additionally has an important benefit vis-a-vis Iran. For the agreement to stick, the U.S. is making India support the impending Security Council resolution(s) on Iran.
The biggest plus: Bush has finally ensured the U.S. a steady supply of delicious, Indian mangoes, which we have been craving for oh-so-long.
