The Middle East is often portrayed by mainstream Western media as a culturally backwards region: overtly religious, rife sectarian conflict, and a hotbed for terrorism. If we take a superficial view of the region, it is entirely possible to justify such caricatures. However, if we’re interested in genuinely understanding the region, the recent phenomenon of privatization of public assets deserves more detail. Sectarianism, admittedly important when discussing these matters, should not be overemphasized when trying to explain the Middle East. Unfortunately, Western commentators discuss sectarianism frequently because it is intellectually simple, politically and economically convenient, and vindicates Western actions in the region.
The conflict in Syria is now almost entirely viewed through a sectarian lens—as Tom Friedman of the New York Times put it, “Sunnis and Shiites have been fighting since the 7th century over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual and political leadership.” Although I cannot deny the sectarian nature of the conflict, dissecting the role of capital and neoliberalism helps to place some of the conflict’s undercurrents within Syria’s socio-economic context.
In 2000, Bashar Al-Assad, the president of Syria, implemented a policy of economic liberalization that resulted in significant changes to Syria’s socioeconomic landscape. It boosted the wealth of the urban merchant classes, who were traditionally Christians thanks to French imperialism, and opened up new opportunities for corruption. These changes came at the expense of Syrian farmers who were not able to compete with Jordanian and Turkish exports. Hence, the first signs of discontent and revolt surfaced from regions heavily dependent on agriculture, such as Deera and Idlib—because of economic, not religious, tensions.
As the conflict progressed, the country was flooded with Iranian and Gulf money, as well as tacit support by the United States and Russia—all contributing to the rise of sectarian identities as a form of political and economic mobilization. Even Iran’s willingness to back an Alawite government, which their Orthodox Shiism considers heretical, is testament to the fact that this conflict is obviously not solely about religion.
Similarly, in Iraq, sectarianism is the word of choice for many pundits attempting to explain the current conflict there—apparently their memory is limited to only the past 10 years.
After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq’s economy was completely restructured along neoliberal lines: foreign investors were given equal rights with Iraqis in the domestic market, a flat tax system was imposed alongside cuts in food and fuel subsidies, and, most importantly, the Iraqi people’s collective ownership of their country’s oil was removed. Unemployment rose to 60 percent and more than 5 million people were living in poverty.
Subsequently, there was a movement away from the state and towards religious communities for welfare and protection. Moreover, the new oil laws were based on a constitution which reinforces sectarian lines by permitting provinces to form “autonomous regions”. Despite most Iraqis opposing federalism, certain Kurdish parties in the North and Shiite parties in the South, who have gone on record as favouring privatization, are pushing for such a policy, and in turn, reinforce ethnic and sectarian cleavages. These groups have mobilized along sectarian lines in a scramble for resources. Once again, to deny the sectarian nature would be foolish, yet to explain everything in terms of sectarianism is an exercise in intellectual lackeyism.
Like a sickness, we need to diagnose the problem in order to know how treat it. Reaching stability may seem impossible at this point, yet there are some simple solutions should at least be discussed in the mainstream discourse. Policymakers, both here and abroad, need to take the socio-economic structures of these countries into account when planning on future action.
Instead of aimlessly throwing money to the ‘opposition’ in Syria (which has strong extremist elements), or supporting the Al-Maliki government in Iraq, we need to be supporting popular, democratic, working-class elements of these countries that are inclusive of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or creed. Moreover, aid and support should be given without contractual obligations of forced privatization, but rather, that help bolster democratic and public institutions that are accountable to the people. The road to peace in the Middle East lies with the secular left.
